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Introduction
The debate surrounding forward-deployed Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command and Control (C2) has been conducted since before 1987 when Special Operations Forces (SOF) were organized under U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Congress mandated the creation of USSOCOM in 1987 to correct serious deficiencies in the ability of the United States to conduct special operations and engage in low-intensity conflict activities. 1 Why the NSW C2 debate continues today is a mystery considering the unambiguous doctrine and law that were established on the subject. When one examines the variations in theater NSW C2 structures, it becomes clear that there are "doctrine and law offenders" in a chain from the NSW community to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
Not only is the NSW community itself guilty (at least by not working more aggressively with the U.S. military community to adhere to established doctrine and law), but the JCS, theater Combatant Commanders, Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC), numbered fleets and component commanders are guilty as well. It is past time to end the debate and restructure NSW C2 in those theaters that violate doctrine and law so that NSW can join its sister SOF components in providing the best possible support to Combatant Commanders worldwide. This paper outlines the CJCS approved doctrine governing NSW C2, the law that supports it, and brings to light the theater variations in NSW C2 that serve to sustain the debate. It will also identify the issue's possible origin (at least a problem that exists today) that manifests itself in each of the operational theaters, and finally propose clear steps required to bring the offending theaters into compliance. Some theaters NSW C2 structures are more doctrinally mature than others, but all of them require revision in some form.
SOF C2 Doctrine and the Law
The fact that NSW forces are a component of the SOF community is well established and is not currently a subject of debate. As part of the SOF community, it follows that NSW C2 should reflect the same C2 doctrine as the rest of the SOF community. The NSW C2 debate centers on who should have Operational Control (OPCON) of forward deployed NSW forces under "normal circumstances", and who should C2 them during war, operations or contingencies. Each of the theaters outside the continental United States (OCONUS) has a different NSW C2 arrangement. Doctrinally, JCS publications outline how SOF C2 is to be arranged and without exception, each states SOF C2 should normally be conducted by SOF. "Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative...though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends." 2 Therefore, if doctrine is authoritative, why are there variations in who has OPCON of forward deployed NSW forces? As it will become evident, there are variations because the Joint Staff and a host of others ignore prescribed doctrine. In all cases, each NSWU is "dual-hatted" meaning it has a formal command relationship with both the TSOC and numbered fleet commander. This dual-hatted structure is a holdover from the time when NSW forces were required to embark and deploy on navy ships as a matter of routine. designation. The various theater C2 arrangements will be discussed in detail later.
One does not need to ponder the notion of a dual-hatted arrangement for long to determine that a NSWU, with two operational chains of command (two "bosses"), clearly does not have a centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2 arrangement. Graphic illustrations of the NSW C2 relationships in EUCOM and PACOM and SOUTHCOM respectively are provided at Appendices A, B and C to depict how complicated NSW C2 has become. 14 Indeed, most NSWU command relationships are anything but clear, and depending on the situation, forces assigned to a NSWU and its deployed NSW Squadron forces are routinely split, and under the OPCON of two different theater component commanders. Therein lies the C2 problem and source of the NSW C2 debate.
As stated earlier, some theaters have a more mature NSW C2 structure that is slowly evolving closer toward doctrine and law, but for the most part, they all violate them. In order to identify the offenders, one must undertake a study of the various theater NSW C2
arrangements.
NSW C2 in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
EUCOM may be the worst doctrine offender of all and will be discussed in detail to illustrate the recurring themes in the other theaters. EUCOM's NSW C2 structure is a disaster with its two geographically separated NSWUs, their resulting separate chains of command, split forces and subsequent diminished unity of effort. Appendix A provides a wire diagram of the NSW C2 arrangement in EUCOM. 15 The diagram illustrates the split in NSW forces between NSWU-2 and NSWU-10 and subsequent split within the NSW Squadron. In the wire diagram, forces OPCON to COMSOCEUR are depicted in purple The most remarkable difference between SOUTHCOM and the other theaters is that SOUTHCOM does not have a U.S. Navy Fleet Commander and staff resident in theater per se. There is no heavy-handed navy staff to lay claim to the NSW forces or exert undue control. If there was, perhaps SOUTHCOM's C2 relationships would be as doctrinally incorrect and unlawful as the other theaters.
Issues at the Combatant Commander level and Navy Resistance
As described for each of the OCONUS theaters, NSW C2 is generally split between the TSOC and numbered fleet commander. Aside from the obvious that these types of C2 TSOCs are reluctant to commit forces to fleet supported contingency because they may not be available when the TSOC needs to respond to a crisis. Conversely, the fleet commanders are not willing to commit allocated forces to the TSOC for the same reason.
As a result, the theater NSWU responsible to the fleet commander under some arrangement, can not solicit additional SOF options in support of fleet contingencies from the TSOC because under the current C2 structures, the TSOCs have no formal tasking to provide support based on individual NSWU fleet-imposed requirements.
Perhaps insight into the Navy's history with SOF and Navy culture can shed some light on why the issue prevails. The Navy vigorously resisted NSW's assignment to USSOCOM from the very beginning (prior to 1987), and it took a contentious ruling by then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger to get the Navy aboard. So strong were the Navy's feelings that even after Secretary Weinberger left office, the Navy attempted to get his decision reversed! "...the Navy, for example, is doing everything they can now to avoid being put into this program [USSOCOM] . I mean, the Navy SEALs--the Secretary of the Navy--I believe it is the Secretary of the Navy--objected to SEALs being included in SOF and after Weinberger left, we get the new secretary and they appeal to him to override Secretary Weinberger's decision which further underscores the difficulty we have in putting SOF together..."
Fortunately, USSOCOM prevailed in the argument. General Lindsay (then USSOCOM Commander) argued that NSW forces belonged to USSOCOM because they were based in the United States, and NSW's relationship to the fleets was no different than a Special Forces Group's assignment to a particular theater, and he wanted to integrate NSW with other SOF. 27 That very logic still applies today --NSW's relationship with the Navy is no different than Army Special Force's is to the Army, or Air Force Special Operations force's to the Air Force --and they aren't having C2 debates. But the Navy continues to resist.
The Navy as an institution resists change and has an inbred "need to control" that it must be willing to relinquish if it is to fully realize the benefits NSW and the SOF communities can provide. The Navy's reputation of being less likely to work well in a truly joint environment, its propensity to "go it alone", stems from the C2 issue, manifests itself in misuse, under-utilization, and SOF/NSW under-representation in campaigns, operations and contingencies. If the Navy truly wants to be "joint", changing NSW C2 is an opportunity to prove it and reap its rewards.
Where does the NSW C2 problem begin?
OCONUS NSW C2 is destined to be doctrinally incorrect and in violation of Title 10 even before forces deploy. The Joint Staff, either due to mistrust in the theater Combatant Commander's ability to allocate NSW forces in theater, misunderstanding of doctrine, or disregard for doctrine and Title 10 are the first on the list of "doctrine and law offenders." While the Joint Staff has the authority to provide specific direction for Combatant Commanders, it is contrary to the doctrine they write and publish. Ironically, the very staff that is chartered to prescribe doctrine violates it.
A Combatant Commander has the responsibility for "organizing and employing commands and forces". 28 This simple NSW C2 structure meets the Joint Pub 3-05 doctrinally established criteria for commanding and controlling SOF and has several inherent advantages:
• It provides a clear and unambiguous chain of command under normal circumstances. It is streamlined, provides the TSOC Commander flexibility, provides unity of command and unity of effort.
• It avoids OPCON transfers between commanders. Adhering to the "requirements based tasking" and prioritization methods, the TSOC can match requirements with the best possible tailored SOF package.
• The TSOC staff experience and expertise to plan, rehearse, conduct and support operations are always available. The TSOC Commander can execute his duties as the Combatant Commander's SOF advisor. The TSOC staff can provide the tailored, operational and tactical level intelligence SOF requires. The TSOC can maintain the authority to deploy and re-deploy SOF support, plus employ its organic mobility options in support.
• The TSOC can allocate appropriate SOF to integrate into the planning process, and provide trained liaison personnel where needed. 
Arguments Against Change
There are strenuous arguments against changing the NSW C2 structure including lingering concerns over change proposals that will "drive a wedge between NSW and the fleet." The Navy's resistance to "giving up" NSW to USSOCOM were outlined earlier. If calmly and unemotionally reasoned however, most arguments against changing NSW C2 to conform to doctrine can be put to rest.
There are definitely instances when Tactical Control of NSW forces should be transferred to one theater component or another to support operational requirements, but they should always remain within a SOF C2 structure. The Navy must grow out of its "need to control" culture if it ever is to realize the full benefits of SOF support.
Embarking NSW or SOF in Navy shipping "just in case" they are needed (and are therefore close at hand) has been the historic --albeit invalid --argument. Step three, upon accepting OPCON of forward deployed NSW forces, the TSOC should delegate and exercise OPCON through a single theater NSWU. Each NSWU was established to support and C2 NSW in theater, and is the best TSOC component entity to do so. As the focal point for all special operations in their respective theaters, TSOCs should take an immediate and aggressive role to correct this discrepancy. It is in the theater's best interest. It is time for the Navy to let go of tradition and "the old way of doing business" and relinquish NSW OPCON to the TSOCs. It is time for the Combatant Commanders to establish the correct NSW C2 structure within their theaters in accordance with their responsibilities. It is time for each TSOC to demand NSW OPCON so they can execute their duties in support of their commanders. Finally, it is time for the NSW community to stand up and take aggressive steps to push the required changes and stop hallucinating about driving a wedge between the NSW community and its parent service.
The recommended C2 structure provided is an example for all theaters to adopt if they truly desire to receive the best possible NSW (and SOF) support, and ultimately win at war or succeed during operations short of war.
Group Air Wing or Destroyer Squadron, a standard SEAL Team is augmented by detachments from a Special Boat Team, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team and other support elements 180 days prior to deployment. This composite group, led by a SEAL O-5 Commanding Officer, is redesignated as a "NSW Squadron" and spends its last 180 days conducting integration training so they are a single, unified, effective and interoperable force when they deploy OCONUS. The NSW Squadron CO reports directly to the NSWU CO. In theory, the NSWU CO identifies support requirements to the NSW Squadron CO who task organizes his composite forces to meet requirements.
